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Abstract 
The implications of the international demonstration effect (IDE) for the development of 
underdeveloped economies have long been studied and debated. Yet few formal analyses exist in 
the literature, especially regarding its implications for the growth of domestic markets and the 
division of labour in developing economies. We offer an analysis of endogenous specialization 
under IDE, the first of its kind, showing that, far more complicated than the scenario held by 
conventional wisdom, IDE makes more difficult the emergence of the market underpinning the 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to formally analyze a hitherto largely overlooked aspect of the 
“international demonstration effect” (IDE) à la Nurkse, namely the effect of international 
consumption externalities on the development of the domestic market and the division of labour in 
the developing economies.  
  
Nurkse (1953) masterly applies Duesenberry’s (1949) notion of demonstration effect, which 
Duesenberry developed to explain the otherwise puzzling saving behavior in the US during first few 
decades of the 20th centuries, to the international plane, arguing that individuals in poor countries 
imitate consumers in rich countries in consumption behavior due to international demonstration. 
Such imitation pushes up the propensity to consume in poor countries, thereby making it more 
difficult for saving accumulation and hence capital formation therein. Pursuing further along 
Nurkse’ major reasoning, focusing on the increasing gap in capital stock between the North and 
the South, Dutt (1988), and recently Araujo and Teixeira (2004) more elaborately by incorporating 
technical progress, formalize the idea that IDE, together with the Prebisch-Singer effect,
1 is 
responsible for the increasing uneven development between the North and the South over time. Of 
course, IDE is by nature a multiple-faced phenomenon, manifesting itself in technology diffusion 
and “dollar shortage” as well (see eg. Nurkse, 1953; Hirschman, 1958 and Kottis, 1971).
2  
        
This paper aims to explore the implications of IDE for the development of the domestic market and 
specialization in production in underdeveloped economies, an aspect that has been largely 
overlooked in the IDE literature. Kottis (1971, p.464) has explicitly discussed the stimulation of IDE 
on the division of labour and specialization in underdeveloped economies. But his treatment is 
fairly sketchy, leaving the extent of the market unaddressed. Moreover, as shown below, IDE does 
not always stimulate the division of labour. We develop a simple model by analytically drawing on 
the burgeoning literature of external habit formation (virtually interchangeably referred to as 
                                                  
∗ We thank but in no way implicate Yew-Kwang Ng and Russell Smyth for useful discussion and comments. 
1  Prebisch (1959) and Singer (1975) argued, as dictated by Engel’s Law, Southern consumers consume 
more and more Northern products as income increases. 
2  Cf. Afxentiou (1979) for an insightful analysis of the conceptual challenge as well as empirical relevance of 
IDE. 
  23 catching-up with the Joneses).  This literature, basically inspired by Veblen’s (1899/1934) 
pioneering analysis, has made noticeable progress in formulating the effect and implications of 
relative consumption/income in the last two decades, thanks to the work of Robert H. Frank and 
Andrew R. Abel among others.
4 The idea is that one’s well-being is affected by the consumption of 
others through a “benchmark” parameter (or the “habit” stock) in the utility function
5. This idea has 
generated fairly intriguing studies and shed new light on issues in several fields, eg., Abel (1990) 
and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) on stock market behavior; Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) on 
public finance in productivity-shock driven economies; Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) on 
endogenous growth models; Jakee and Sun (2005) on political economy of the welfare state, etc. 
With regard to evidence of the consumption externality, Luttmer (2004) finds that empirically 
“higher earnings of neighbors are associated with lower levels of self-reported happiness”, and 
Ravina (2005), examining a panel data set of Californian credit card accounts, concludes that “the 
strength of the external habit, captured by the fraction of the consumption of the reference group 
that enters the utility function, is 0.290”. Zizzo (2003) surveys empirical evidence on how 
preference is informed by environmental factors and inter-personal relative consumption/income in 
particular. This evidence is obtained from several disciplines including development psychology, 
experimental economics, neurosciences, comparative culture studies, etc.   
  
Another literature on which we draw is that of endogenous specialization. Martens (1999) and 
Cheng and Yang (2004) provide two comprehensive surveys of this literature, of which one major 
aim is to revive and further elaborate classical economic thought, as represented by Adam Smith 
(1776) and Allyn Young (1928), on the key role played by the division of labour in economic 
performance in general, and in economic growth and development in particular.  
  
In this paper, we develop a simple model of endogenous specialization under IDE to examine the 
consequences of having rich neighbors, in the international arena, on the development of the 
                                                  
3 It is noteworthy that Nurkse (1953, p.61) used the term “keeping up with the Joneses” to refer to Veblen’s 
concept of conspicuous consumption, as a contrast to “demonstrating leading to imitation”. In the 
contemporary literature of external habit formation, catching/keeping up with the Joneses, however, is far 
closer to the Duesenberry-Nurkse’ demonstration effect than to Veblen’s conspicuous consumption. For a 
criticism of Nurkse’s explicit rejection of the Veblenian consumption when analysing IDE, see James 
(2000A). Our analysis below will be confined to the Nurksian IDE.  
4  See, e.g., Frank (1999) and Abel (1990). The idea that one’s preference is not ex ante given is of course 
quite old. For instance, Marx (1857-58) already touches on some rudimentary notions of how one’s wellbeing 
is influenced by the social environment including others’ affluence. See also Marshall (1890, Appendix 2, 
Sections 6-7).    
5 That one’s well-being is affected by her own past consumption history is called the internal habit formation. 
  3domestic market, the allocation of resource and division of labour within a relatively 
underdeveloped economy/country. Our analysis shows that at the primitive stage of economic 
development, there exists another effect on the wellbeing of individuals in a poor economy, which 
manifests itself through hindering emergence of labour specialization therein. This is in addition to 
the well understood curse of being in the shadow of rich neighbors, i.e., a disutility derived out of 
neighbors’ affluence due to relative economic standing, But once the economy “takes off” in the 
sense that domestic division of labour and the underpinning market system have been established, 
IDE may, as Kottis (1971, p.464) correctly points out, “stimulate the division of labour and 
specialization”, through expanding the market.     
  
Before moving on to a formal analysis, it may be worthwhile to expand a few more words on the 
detrimental implications of IDE under certain circumstances for the emergence of the division of 
labour, because of the counter-intuitiveness of such implications.  As has been thoroughly studied 
in economic analysis, international trade undoubtedly brings about mutual benefits to trade 
partners, especially when there exist significant comparative advantages between them, for 
instance when one has comparative advantage in making capital intensive products and the other 
in making labour intensive products. It is also well understood that a more integrated system of 
economies/regions facilitates information flow, technology diffusion, etc, thus resulting in 
remarkable welfare improvement, even, for some reasons, in the absence of materialized trade. 
Without denying the above benefits brought in by intercourse between the countries, and in no way 
arguing against market integration, we nonetheless would like to draw attention to one side-effect 
of international interaction other than its well-articulated negative effect on capital formation 
(Nurkse, 1953), that is, the effect brought about by the mere knowledge of the existence of a richer 
lifestyle elsewhere on the performance of the poorer economy. This externality originates from the 
acquisition of information, via trade or otherwise, of higher levels of consumption in rich 
countries/economies, and carries on to affect the pattern of division of labour in the poor 
economy.
6 It is apparent that this consumption externality is welfare-reducing, but how does it 
affect the domestic level of specialization? A first guess would be: to “catch up with the Joneses” 
(the rich foreigners, in this case), people in this poor economy will work harder in order to consume 
more, and thereby extending the market size and creating scope for higher level of specialization. 
However, our analysis suggests quite the opposite: as the level of externality increases, the level of 
domestic specialization may deteriorate, thus resulting in a decline in per capita income.  
                                                  
6 It is true that such international consumption externality goes in both directions, but we shall focus on the 
effect on the poor economy only, for the effect on the individual in the affluent regions/economies is 
presumably by far smaller, since human beings by nature derive much more disutility from having a richer 
neighbour than utility from a poorer neighbour.  
  4  This result may, to many, run counter to intuition, but it is not inexplicable, as shown in the 
next section. Section 3 concludes, briefly remarking on implications of our analysis.      
 
2.   ANALYSIS 
2.1.   A model of endogenous specialization with consumption externality 
To isolate IDE as clearly as possible, we deliberately assume throughout that no trade occurs, 
since otherwise the analysis would be much more complicated without generating more insights. 
  
Consider an isolated economy, for instance, a small island that virtually has no contact with other 
societies. All the inhabitants are assumed intrinsically identical in all characteristics, each has one 
unit of time endowment. There are two consumption goods X and Y. The utility function of each 
individual is  , where x(y) represents the amount consumed of X(Y).  The production 
function, specific to each individual, is the same for both goods, with a constant marginal return 
and a fixed learning cost,   
xy y x u = ) , (
, b ax lX + = 0 ,    , > + = b a b ay lY . That is,    amount of labour is 
needed to produce x (y) units of X (Y). Note that there exist economies of specialization in 
production due to the fixed learning cost, which implies that the division of labour among agents 
within the said economy can save on total learning costs for the society as a whole by avoiding 
duplicated learning. An iceberg trading (purchasing) technology is assumed,  , 
) ( Y X l l
kx x g = ) ( ky y g = ) ( , 
, that is, costs of exchanging are borne by the buyers alone and a fraction 1- ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ k k of each unit 
of good purchased disappears in transit.
7
  
X Y p p p / ≡ p Denoting the price of Y in terms of X as  ,  , it is quite straightforward to identify the 
equilibrium structure of division of labour by the algorithm developed in Sun (2003) for solving 
endogenous specialization models as surveyed in Cheng and Yang (2004). The result is 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
2 )] 1 /( ) 2 1 [( * b b k − − = )  Table 1. Parameter subspaces and equilibria for Example 1 (
      * k k < * k k >
                                                  
7  The budget balance of each agent implies that any seller of one good must be a buyer of the other good, 
and therefore the assumption that only buyers pay the trading cost is made purely for simplifying modelling 
analyses and should be interpreted as covering a quite general family of forms in which the buyers and 
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p*=1  (shadow equilibrium price set) 
Structure of the 
division of labor 
no trade among agents  Division of labor (half population 
specialize in producing X(Y)) 
 
The basic trade-off between gains from specialization (saving on learning costs) and trading costs 
determines the equilibrium pattern of the division of labour in production for the whole economy. 
The division of labour occurs in equilibrium if and only if  , which may 
legitimately be interpreted either as that the trading efficiency is high enough for a fixed production 
technology and endowments, or as that the economies of specialization are sufficiently significant 
for given trading conditions, 
2 )] 1 /( ) 2 1 [( b b k − − >
) 2 /( ) 1 ( k k b − − > , so that gains from the division of labour 
outweigh the costs of exchange between individuals of different specialization patterns. For our 
purpose, we shall mainly take the first interpretation in what follows.  
  
Now assume that the isolation of the economy is, for some reason, brought to an end, and the 
inhabitants in the “island economy” get to learn of the consumption levels of inhabitants in some 
other economies, which are realistically assumed to be considerably richer than the economy 
under analysis. Through the mechanism of “external habit”, the observation of the foreigners’ 
higher consumption results in less satisfaction from the same bundle of consumption than before. 
For simplicity, following in spirit the modeling used in the literature of “catching up with the 
Joneses”,
8 ) )( ( ) , ( θ θ − − = y x y x u  we revise the utility function to characterize this externality as  , 
where  θ  is a positive and small real number characterizing the international consumption 
externality, which depends on the gap in consumption/income between the richer countries and the 
poor economy, as well as the extent to which consumers in the poor economy are aware of such a 
gap. In other words, the benchmark consumption level of the locals increases due to the external 
habit formation mechanism, through which awareness of higher levels of consumption in more 
advanced economies makes the locals feel jealous and that they have fallen behind..
9 To explore 
the implications of this effect alone, we assume that the economy is now open only in terms of 
information inflow, that is, the opulence of other economies comes to the knowledge of the 
inhabitants in the poor economy, but neither trade with, nor foreign direct investment from the other 
                                                  
8  Refer to, Abel (1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Auray et al (2002), 
Alvares-Cuadrado et al (2004) among others. 
9 Here we ignore the influence of “external habit” between fellow residents in the economy, since it makes no 
difference to the analysis at hand. See p.1-2 of Luttmer (2004). 
  6economies materializes. For convenience, we call such an economy as an informatively open 
economy.         
  
Applying again the algorithm used above, we obtain the following,  
 
Table 1’. Parameter subspaces and equilibria of modified Example 1 
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p*=1  (shadow equilibrium price set) 
Structure of the 
division of labor 
no trade among agents  Division of labor (half population 
specialize in producing X(Y)) 
 
It comes as no surprise that the utility level, regardless of the values of parameters, declines as a 
consequence of informative opening of the poor economy, for the benchmark consumption level of 
each good increases after the opening. What is interesting is that after the opening, the efficiency 
of trading that allows for the emergence of labour specialization has to increase. Indeed, it can be 
shown that  0 / * * > ∂ ∂ θ k  (we omit the details to save space). That is, due to the psychological 
pressure from the more luxurious lifestyle of the richer economies, the economy under analysis, in 
the absence of trade with, or foreign direct investment from, the former, may move backwards in 
terms of degree of domestic division of labour. For a certain range of trading efficiency parameter 
, the domestic market shrinks (to zero) and the social organization of production degenerates 
from one featured by labour specialization into another without division of labour and hence gains 
from domestic division of labour and trade forgone. This result may appear somehow counter-
intuitive. But it indeed holds true even for a more general model. We shall illustrate the result in an 
economically intuitive manner after analyzing the generalized model.  
k
 
2.2.   The generalized model   
We now consider a more general form of preference represented by the following CES utility 
function  , 
ρ ρ ρ
θ θ θ
/ 1 ] ) ( ) [( ) , ( − + − = y x y x u 1 < ρ . The production technology exhibits increasing 
returns to labour specialization,   ) ( X l f x = ) ( Y l f y = ,  . The trading technology remains 
unchanged from the preceding subsection.  
  7  
Equilibrium solutions of this model are summarized in Table 2 below.  
 
Table 2. Parameter subspaces and equilibria of the generalized model 
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Note   denotes the critical value of the trading parameter   at which it makes no difference in 
terms of utility for the agent to 
k
either specialize and engage in trade, or self-produce both goods 
with no exchange with others. 
  
We claim (proof is found in Appendix), 
Proposition 1. The larger the externality of consumption in the more prosperous economy for the 
informatively open economy, the less likely the domestic division of labour emerges in the latter, 
i.e.,   
0 /
~
> ∂ ∂ θ k
 
  8 
Figure 1 
 
Now we illustrate this result graphically in Figure 1. The indifference curves passing through the 
autarky point A before and after the opening of information are denoted by I0 and I1 respectively. It 
can be shown that I1 is more convex than I0, and more generally, the greater the value of θ , the 
more convex the curve I1 is.
10 y x <  To illustrate, consider the situation when   (analysis for the 
                                                  
10 For any value of θ , consider the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) along the indifference curve,     
. Denote by   the amount of x and y when they are equal, i.e.,  = θ u θ x
ρ ρ ρ θ θ
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− − − =
1 )] /( ) [( x y dx dy MRS / − = . Thus, for 
any  ( ),   increases (decreases) with  θ x x < θ x x > MRS θ . 
  9y x > case of   is similar). As the benchmark consumption of each goods increases, one has to be 
given more Y for one less unit of X in order to remain on the same utility level (indifference curve), 
since goods X is in effect scarcer and thus has to be given greater relative importance to goods Y, 
due to the preference for variety characterized by the CES utility function. Note that  1 < ρ  implies 
the convexity of preference. In Figure 1, points B and C represent individual choices of specializing 
in X and Y, respectively. Symmetry of the model between goods X and Y requires that the two 
goods are of the same price when division of labour and exchange occur. Consequently, the 
critical level of trading efficiency  , i.e., k
~
k , alone determines the slopes of two budget lines BB’ 
and CC’ for X experts and Y experts respectively (whereas dashed budget lines BB” and CC” 
represent the case after information opening), which are tangent to the indifference curve passing 
through the autarkic equilibrium point A when  k k
~
= . It is then clear that a larger externality will 
induce a more convex group of indifference curves and thus a higher level of   is required for 
specialization to emerge.  
k
 
Intuitively, after the informative opening, for any individual in this economy all the physical 
constraints stay the same, but psychologically he is disadvantaged. The larger the value of  θ  (the 
stronger the externality), the more indispensable both goods X and Y. Due to the preference for 
diversity as characterized by the convex indifference curves, in the case of having more X than Y, 
x>y, the marginal rate of substitution   decreases with  Y X /MU MU θ . That is, for any one choosing 
to be an X specialist, she must give up more X in order to gain one more unit of Y when moving 
along the same indifference curve as  θ  becomes larger. Thus, for specialization and division of 
labour to emerge, a higher level of trading efficiency is needed after the informative opening.  
2.3.   An expanded model with time allocation between working hours and leisure  
We now expand the above model to incorporate the choice of working-hours versus leisure. 
Assume that the utility function is = ) , , ( s y x uθ   , s y x ⋅ − + −
ρ ρ ρ θ θ
/ 1 ] ) ( ) [( 1 < ρ , where   stands 
for leisure
s
11. The production technology is assumed linear with a fixed set-up cost to simplify the 
algebra without loss of insights,  , α + = x lX 0 , > + = α α y lY   . That is,    is needed to  ) ( Y X l l
                                                  
11 The effect of a benchmark level for leisure is neglected here, since consumption (or income) is generally 
considered a major source for relative economic standing but for some special circumstances such as the 
political economy of redistribution in the welfare state (Lindbeck et al 1999, Jakee and Sun 2005). See 
Solnick and Hemenway (1998) and Zizzo (2003) for empirical evidence on the significance of relative 
consumption/income concerns.  
  10produce x (y) units of X(Y). The trading technology remains unchanged from the preceding 
subsection. Once again, what interests us is the critical value of k , denoted as  , such that if and 
only if  , the division of labour emerges. To save space, we omit the table that summarizes 
the equilibrium analyses (the counterpart of Tables 1 and 2 of the above two models), but must 
point out that the spirit of Proposition 1 still holds true even for such an expanded model wherein 
utility derives from consumptions as well as from leisure. We posit (proof is found in Appendix),  
k ˆ
k k ˆ >
 
Proposition 2. For the expanded model as above, the larger the externality of consumption in the 
more prosperous economy for the informatively open economy, the less likely the domestic division 
of labour emerges in the latter, i.e.,   
0 / ˆ > ∂ ∂ θ k
2.4.   Extent of the existing market and labour supply  
In the preceding two subsections, our analysis focuses on the critical value of the trading efficiency 
parameter   concerning the emergence of the domestic market and the division of labour from 
the autarkic equilibrium. We now turn to how IDE impacts the extent of the market and division of 
labour 
* k
if  the market that supports the nexus of the domestic division of labour has already 
materialized.   
  
For the model introduced in subsection 2.2, if the domestic division of labour has already emerged, 
the amount of sold product per person, which can well serve as a proxy for the trade volume 
(extent) of the market, equals    
) 1 /(
) 1 /( 1
1











s s     
which clearly increases with the IDE parameter θ . For the model incorporating the leisure-
consumption choice considered in subsection 2.3, one can easily show that both the extent of the 
market and labour supply (also labour specialization in this case) of each individual increases with 
the IDE parameter θ  (to save space we omit details). All these are consistent with the familiar 
argument as put forward long ago by Nurkse (1953, p. 63) and Kottis (1971, Section III) that 
awareness of luxurious lifestyles elsewhere encourages individuals in the poor economies to work 
harder, to be more specialized and to trade more, in order to catch up with the (foreign) Joneses in 
consumption.   
  It appears in order to emphasize once again that we deliberately isolate the international 
externalities of (relative) consumption by considering a model without international trade or 
international technology diffusion. As such, each consumption product in our simple model is 
domestically produced and is not a new product, e.g., a “gadget” imported from the North. Even so, 
the extent of external (international) habit formation mechanism alone suffices to expand the 
  11already existing domestic market and hence enhance the per capita income (but not the wellbeing 
of the people) in the underdeveloped economies.    
 
3.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Implications of the international demonstration effect (IDE) for development of underdeveloped 
economies have long been studied and debated since Nurkse (1953) raised the issue. Yet few 
formal analyses exist in the literature, especially with regards to the implication of IDE for the 
growth of domestic markets and division of labour in the poor economies. Drawing on recently 
developed analytical apparatus in the burgeoning literature of external habit formation, we offer an 
analysis of endogenous specialization under IDE, the first of its kind to the best of our knowledge, 
showing that the effect of international consumption externalities on the growth of the domestic 
market may be more complicated than held by conventional wisdom. Our analysis reveals that IDE 
makes more difficult the emergence of the market underpinning the domestic division of labour, but 
facilitates the expansion of the market once the market has been activated. Our model as such 
accommodates both the favorable and unfavorable effects, depending on the stage of economic 
development, of international demonstration for the development of the domestic market in the 
poor economy.  
  
In particular, the detrimental consequence of IDE for the (under)development of the domestic 
market and labour specialization under certain circumstances may merit a few more words. As 
shown above, when the development of the domestic market system in a primitive economy 
merely takes off, awareness by its inhabitants therein of the income/consumption gap between rich 
and poor economies may lead to an unintended degradation in domestic division of labour and 
specialization. That is, on top of the negative, sometimes even devastating, Nurksian effect on 
capital formation in the underdeveloped economy (Nurkse 1953), IDE may bring in another 
detrimental consequence by hindering the development of the domestic market and (interregional 
and/or inter-personal) division of labour.  Contrary to conventional wisdom, our analysis therefore 
demonstrates a perhaps even more troubling possibility that under plausible conditions, 
international demonstration may indeed provide a disincentive to have more produced for market 
exchange, making it more difficult for the nexus of the domestic division of labour to expand.   
 
A careful reader maybe concerned with the robustness of our result with regard to the symmetry 
between products in our model, which is deliberately designed for the sake of analytical 
convenience. A more realistic postulate might be that consumers are more sensitive to the relative 
consumption of some particular product(s), the so called positional goods, and far less so to other 
(non-positional) goods. Analysis of asymmetric models modified from those presented in Section 2  
such that the agents are sensitive only to the consumption of product X (but not product Y) reveals 
  12that the major conclusions as obtained in subsections 2.2-2.4 remain unchanged, provided that 
IDE (of consumption in X) are not unrealistically too strong. (We omit the algebraic details, which 
are available upon request).       
 
The parameter θ  , serving as a proxy for the extent of IDE in consumption in our analysis, is 
treated as exogenously given. As recognized by Nurkse (1953) and James (2000B) among other 
authors, IDE in consumption/income is determined by the consumption/income gap between the 
poor and rich countries/economies, but can only be put into effect by the awareness of the gap by 
consumers in the poor economy. The former, on which most existing studies of IDE focus (e.g., 
Araujo and Teixeira, 2004), is undoubtedly important, yet the latter, due to the rapid diffusion of 
mass media and telecommunication technologies such as radios, televisions, mobile phones and 
perhaps more profoundly, the Internet, as well as a no less noticeable rise in global advertising, 
may deserve far more attention than it has so far received. Consumers in the poor economies 
suffer not only from “frustration and disappointment” from the awareness of the gap as cogently 
analyzed in James (2000B), but also, indirectly, from the underdevelopment of domestic market 
system as revealed in the analysis conducted in this paper.          
  
It must be pointed out that our analysis should in no way be interpreted as an argument against 
international trade, and globalization in particular. It merely serves to highlight an important aspect 
of the consequences of increasing international contact that seems to have been overlooked so 
far. True, international contact whether or not in the form of trade, helps to provide more 
opportunity for advanced technology of production to spread into the underdeveloped economies. 
Yet it is much easier for consumption patterns on vogue in advanced countries to become targets 
for consumers in the underdeveloped countries trying to catch up with the (foreign) Joneses, 
thanks to the modern communication technology and advertising (James 2000B).
12 Moreover, 
benefits from international trade are not automatically realized for underdeveloped economies if 
developed countries do not open the market of those products/industries in which underdeveloped 
economies have comparative advantage; for instance, labour intensive agricultural products. 
Should this situation occur, without foreign direct investment or international income transfer one 
way or another, underdeveloped economies can only be trapped in a vicious circle, suffering not 
only from the problem of capital shortage, but also from a lack of a well-functioning system of 
markets as implied by our formal analysis. Indeed, there may well be the case that concomitant 
with informative opening of underdeveloped economies are the shrinking of domestic markets, 
                                                  
12  It goes without saying that to incorporate IDE in production into the analysis of endogenous division of 
labour and market process would be a valuable extension of what is conducted in this paper. We leave this 
task to future study.   
  13declining productivity and decreasing welfare, testifying to Duesenberry’s (1949, p.27) witty remark 
that “…it is not only true that ‘what you don’t know won’t hurt you,’ but that what you do know does 
hurt you.” To counteract the effects of international demonstration, which are virtually inevitable 
thanks to modern information technology, it is vital for primitive economies to be integrated into, 
and benefit from, materialized international trade. But that can take place only if free trade regimes 
prevail to fully exploit the mutual benefits from trade; that is, all trading partner countries adopt free 
trade policy, especially the advanced ones. 
  14 
APPENDIX 
We offer in this appendix proof of the two propositions presented in the text.    
Proof of Proposition 1. First of all, note that in the case of no exchange with fellow beings of the 
economy and hence no division of labour among individuals, the agent evenly spends time 
producing each goods due to the convexity of preferences. Hence the maximized utility, 
] ) 2 / ( [ 2
~ / 1 θ
ρ − = L f U A . On the other hand, in the case of trading with others under a competitive 
price signal, which must be equal unity in equilibrium, the maximized utility is  
ρ ρ ρ θ θ
/ 1 } ) ( ] ) ( {[
~
− + − − = kx x L f Max U
x
B   .  
ρ ρ ρ ρ θ θ
/ ) 1 ( ) 1 /( ] 1 }[ ] ) ( [ {
− − + − − = k L f k
 
A B U U k H
~ ~
) , ( − ≡ θ Let      =0. It directly 
follows from the envelop theorem that, 
ρ ρ ρ ρ θ θ
/ ) 1 ( ) 1 /( ] 1 }[ ] ) ( [ {
− − + − − = k L f k ] ) 2 / ( [ 2
/ 1 θ
ρ − − L f
0 /
~
> ∂ ∂ = k U B k H ∂ ∂ / . On the other hand, 
θ ∂ ∂ / H
ρ ρ ρ ρ / ) 1 ( )] 1 ( 2 /[ } 2 { 2
− − − k k
ρ / 1 2 =
ρ ρ ρ ρ / ) 1 ( ) 1 /( ] 1 )[ 1 (
− − + + − k k
ρ / 1 2 < 0 =     . Thus, by the implicit 




/ /( ) / ( > ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ − k H H θ . Proposition 1 is thus established.   
     Q . E . D .    
 
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1. In the case of no exchange with 
fellow beings in the economy and hence no division of labour among individuals, the agent evenly 
spends time producing each goods due to the convexity of preferences. Manipulating the algebra, 
one obtains the maximized value of utility,  
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On the other hand, in the case of trading with others under a competitive price signal, which must 
equal unity in equilibrium, the maximized utility is   
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When  0 > ρ ,  , and  2 1
) 1 /( > +
− ρ ρ k . Hence,  . When 
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− ρ ρ k . Thus, we also have,  . 
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− ρ ρ . Thus,  .  But, 
 
On the other hand it follows immediately from the envelop theorem that,  
0 ˆ / > ∂ ∂ k V  
 
Thus, by the implicit theorem,  
0 ) ˆ / /( ) / ( / ˆ > ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ − = ∂ ∂ k V V k θ θ              Q . E . D .  
  
  16REFERENCES    
Abel, A. 1990. Asset pricing under habit formation and catching up with the Joneses, American 
Economic Review, vol. 80, no. 2, 38–42 
Afxentiou, P. C. 1979. The demonstration effect and its internationalization: A theoretical appraisal, 
Economia Internationale, Feb., 51-65 
Alvarez-Cuadrado, F., Monteiro, G. and Turnovsky, S. J. 2004. Habit formation, catching up with 
the Joneses and economic growth, Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 9, no. 1, 47-80 
Araujo, R. A. and Teixeira, J. R. 2004. Structural economic dynamics: An alternative approach to 
North-South models, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 28, 705-17 
Auray, S., Collard, F. and Fève, P. 2002. Money and external habit persistence: A tale for chaos, 
Economics Letters, vol. 76, 121–27 
Campbell, J. and Cochrane, J. 1999. By force of habit: a consumption-based explanation of 
aggregate stock market behavior, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 107, no. 2, 205-51  
Cheng, W. and Yang, X. 2004. Inframarginal analysis of division of labour: A survey,  Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 55, no. 2, 137-74  
Duesenberry, J. S. 1949. Income, Saving, and the Theory of Consumer Behavior, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, Harvard University Press 
Dutt, A. K. 1988. Inelastic demand for Southern goods, international demonstration effects and 
uneven development, Journal of Development Economics, vol. 29, 111-22  
Frank, R. 1999. Luxury Fever: Why Money Fails to Satisfy in an Era of Excess, New York, Free 
Press 
Hirschman, A. O. 1958. The Strategy of Economic Development, New York, Yale University Press     
Jakee, K. and Sun, G.-Z. 2005. External habit formation and dependency in the welfare state, 
European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 21, 83-98 
James, J. 2000A. Positional goods, conspicuous consumption and the international demonstration 
effect reconsidered, World Development, vol. 15, no. 4, 449-62  
James, J. 2000B. Do consumers in developing countries gain or lose from globalization, Journal of 
Economic Issues, vol. XXXIV, no. 3, 537-51 
Kottis, G. C. 1971. The international demonstration effect as a factor affecting economic 
development, Kyklos, vol. 24, 455-72 
Lindbeck, A., Nyberg, S. and Weibull, J. 1999. Social norms and economic incentives in the 
welfare state, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 114, no. 1, 1–35 
  17Ljungqvist, L. and Uhlig, H. 2000. Tax policy and aggregate demand management under Catching 
Up with the Joneses, American Economic Review, vol. 90, no. 3, 356-66 
Luttmer, E. 2004. Neighbors as negatives: relative earnings and well-being, NBER Working Paper 
W1066. 
Marshall, A. 1890. Principles of Economics, 8th Edition, Macmillan and Co Limited, London, 1959 
Martens, B. 1999. The evolution of the concept of division of labour in economics, Max Planck 
Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Jena, Discussion Paper 18-99  
Marx, K. 1857-58/1973. Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (rough draft), 
Translated with a Forward by M. Nicolaus, Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1973 (1857-58)  
Nurkse, R. 1953. Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries, Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford, 8th Impression 1962   
Prebisch, R. 1959. Commercial policy in underdeveloped countries, American Economic Review, 
vol. 49, no. 2, 251-73 
Ravina, E. 2005. Keeping up with the Joneses: evidence from micro data, mimeo, Department of 
Economics, Northwestern University  
Singer, H. 1975. The Strategy of International Development, London, Macmillan 
Smith, A. 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Edited by E. 
Cannan,  Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1976 
Solnick, S. and Hemenway, D. 1998. Is more always better? A survey on positional concerns, 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 37, no. 3, 373-83  
Sun, G.-Z. 2003. Identification of equilibrium structures of endogenous specialization: a unified 
approach exemplified, in Yew-Kwang Ng et al (eds.), The Economics of E-Commerce and 
Networking Decisions, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 195-213   
Veblen, T. 1899. The Theory of the Leisure Class, Reprinted, New York, The Modern Library 1934  
Young, A. 1928. Increasing returns and economic progress, The Economic Journal, vol. 38, 527-42 
Zizzo, D. J. 2003. Empirical evidence on interdependent preferences: Nature or Nurture? 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 27, 867-80 
 
 
 
  18